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period in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 








Ineffective aid management and coordination as well as old fashion model of aid 
sequencing were few of the major culprits why Bosnia and Herzegovina is still not on 
self sustainable path. Government representatives should eagerly embrace newest 
incentive related to increase in aid effectiveness-Paris Declaration. 
Commitments of Official Development Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina exceeded 
$ 7 billion from 1996 to 2004. We presented sectoral destination of aid funds and 
indicators of aid effectiveness. While aid driven post-conflict reconstruction has been 
relatively successful, insufficient structural reforms made BiH lagging behind most of the 
transition countries in the region. 
The most important achievements took place in the peace implementation activities 
which were necessary for ensuring reconciliation and a fertile ground for reconstruction 
and recovery. International support for establishment and maintenance of security 
exceeded $ 18 billion in the period 1996-2004. 
Further reforms, expected in near future, would not be possible in politically essentially 







   2 
 Contents                                                                                                                         Page 
 
 
1. Introduction..................................................................................................................... 4 
2. Ownership and aid coordination..................................................................................... 5 
2.1 War consequences..................................................................................................... 5 
2.2 Ownership and political dependency........................................................................ 6 
2.2.1 Ownership on the reconstruction process.......................................................... 6 
2.2.2 Political dependency.......................................................................................... 7 
1.3 Aid coordination and management........................................................................... 8 
3. Official Development Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina..................................... 11 
3.1 General notes .......................................................................................................... 11 
3.2 How much?............................................................................................................. 12 
3.3 ODA impact on macroeconomic situation.............................................................. 14 
4. Sectoral analysis............................................................................................................ 18 
4.1. Sectors.................................................................................................................... 18 
4.2 Emergency assistance............................................................................................. 20 
4.3 Economic infrastructure.......................................................................................... 23 
4.3.1 Transport.......................................................................................................... 24 
4.3.2 Communications.............................................................................................. 25 
4.3.2 Energy.............................................................................................................. 26 
4.3.3 Banking & Financial    Services ...................................................................... 27 
4.3.4 Business & Other Services .............................................................................. 28 
4.4 Social infrastructure and services ........................................................................... 30 
4.4.1 Education......................................................................................................... 31 
4.4.2 Health............................................................................................................... 32 
4.4.3 Water Supply & Sanitation.............................................................................. 33 
4.4.4 Government and Civil Society......................................................................... 33 
4.4.5 Production sector ............................................................................................. 36 
4.5 Military aid (Aid for security)................................................................................. 36 
5. Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 39 
APPENDIX 1.................................................................................................................... 41 













   3 
 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
AMA           Aid management agency 
 
BiH              Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
CBA            Currency Board Arrangement 
 
DAC           Development Assistance Committee 
 
ETF             Economic Task Force  
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GFAP           General Framework Agreement for Peace  
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ODA            Official Development Assistance 
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PIC               Peace Implementation Council 
 
RS                Republic of Serpska 
 
SAA             Stabilization and Association Agreement 
 
SFOR           Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
USAID         United States Agency for International Development 
 
WB              World Bank   4 
1. Introduction 
 
The past 40 years have witnessed occurrence of extensive literature on the effectiveness 
of foreign aid. The impact of aid has been evaluated at both the micro- and 
macroeconomic level. Scope of research encompassed cross-country and single-country 
case studies, broad surveys of a qualitative and inter-disciplinary nature as well as 
quantitative analyses. 
Hansen and Tarp identified three generations of empirical work: early Harrod-Domar 
models, reduced form aid-growth models and new growth theory reduced-form models 
(Hansen, Tarp, 2000).  
Traditional literature and tools developed in order to examine the impact of conventional 
development aid are not appropriate for the analysis of financial and technical assistance 
in war torn Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Demekas, McHugh and Kosma gave 
comprehensive explanation of differences between conventional and post-conflict aid. 
Those include circumstances, objectives, size, time profile and composition of aid 
(Demekas, McHugh and Kosma, 2002). 
Most of the studies on post-conflict aid emphasized that effective reconstruction 
assistance can not be provided without three essential elements: a secure environment, a 
strategic vision for the overall effort, and strong leadership (GAO, 2003). In this paper 
reconstruction process in Bosnia and Herzegovina is clarified and results presented. 
Post-conflict reconstruction aid as a unique form of development assistance has two 
major goals:  
 
•  To address short-term challenges which may include humanitarian assistance and 
other forms of relief and emergency assistance 
•  To repair and create new physical and institutional infrastructure necessary to 
support long-term economic development.  
 
While these goals of relief and development are not inherently incompatible, effectively 
distributing resources that balance these short and long-term goals is potentially the most 
difficult challenge for post-conflict aid. 
Some recent studies emphasized another aspect of reconstruction process which 
traditional approach often neglected - economic governance. 
What mattered first in post-conflict situations (after a political compromise has been 
struck) were emergency shelter, rural reconstruction, and refugee returnee programs. 
These are of course important, but they provide only an immediate assistance package 
that is not itself sufficient for improving economic governance or resolving the 
underlying conditions fueling conflict. Only more significant steps, to create conditions 
for economic recovery, employment, and growth, will put a country back on the path of 
development what implies that economic governance needs to be addressed from the 
early stages of post-conflict assistance (USAID, 2004).  
Another problem with post-conflict countries occurs if they become recurrent users of 
international financial assistance. These countries often lack the incentive and ability to 
make necessary reforms what results in creation of political or/and financial dependence 
mentality.   5 
Although human and financial resources are essential for reconstruction, aid management 
and funding have a major impact on the effectiveness with which these resources are 
utilized. Domestic institutions must be built that can eventually take over the 
reconstruction process. Since aid coordination has become a critical factor in managing 
post-conflict reconstruction in Section 2 we discuss ownership and aid coordination in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Section 3 presents amounts of Official Development Assistance committed and disbursed 
to BiH in the period 1996-2004 and impact on the macroeconomic stability. 
The latter is then broadened with sectoral analysis in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Ownership and aid coordination 
2.1 War consequences 
 
Tragic conflict in the Region, as the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in 
BiH, defined war destruction in the period from 1992 to 1995, left the Republic 
devastated. The war radically altered the social fabric of life: approximately 250 thousand 
people were killed and 17 thousand were officially recorded as missing, while half the 
country’s prewar domicile population of 4.5 million was displaced from their homes. Out 
of this number, some 1.2 million persons sought refugee protection in over 100 countries 
all over the world, while at the same time around million persons were displaced within 
BiH (MOHRR, 2005). 
Most of the country’s 1.3 million workers lost their jobs, many lost savings with the 
freezing of bank assets and more than 80 percent of the population received some form of 
food aid. Young people throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina lost years of schooling, and 
much of the population suffered physical disabilities and psychological trauma (WB, 
1999). As the consequence of the war the mortality rate was increased on one hand, and 
natural population growth in BiH decreased on the other hand.  
More than a third of housing stock was damaged or devastated and over 4% of BiH’s 
territory was covered with mines.  
By the end of 1995, output had drastically fallen and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had 
collapsed to less than US$500 per capita, about 20 percent of its prewar level. 
Destruction of physical capital-transport, communications and power networks – caused 
much of the contraction.  
The war also disrupted trade channels, halted nascent economic reforms, and left 
pervasive rifts in government, institutions, and laws.  
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2.2 Ownership and political dependency  
2.2.1 Ownership on the reconstruction process 
 
Following the successful negotiation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995, 
a Peace Implementation Conference was held in London on December 8-9, 1995, to 
mobilize international support for the Agreement. The meeting resulted in the 
establishment of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). 
The PIC comprises 55 countries and agencies that support the peace process in many 
different ways - by assisting it financially, enforcing the military and security aspects of 
peace operations under the terms of UN Security Council Resolutions 1031- providing 
troops for peacekeepers, first under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
command (IFOR, later SFOR) and since 2004 under the European Union command 
(EUFOR), or directly running operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Since the London Conference, the PIC has come together at the ministerial level another 
five times to review progress and define the goals of peace implementation for the 
coming period: in June 1996 in Florence; in December 1996 for a second time in London; 
in December 1997 in Bonn; in December 1998 in Madrid, and in May 2000 in Brussels. 
Supreme leadership was vested in the Office of the High Representative (OHR) (WB, 
2000). 
According to Article V of Annex 10 (Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the Peace 
Settlement) to the GFAP in BiH the High Representative (HR) is the final authority in 
theatre regarding interpretation of the said Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of 
the Peace Settlement. Considering in particular Article II.1. (d) of the last said Annex,  
the High Representative shall “Facilitate, as the High Representative judges necessary, 
the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with civilian implementation” .
1 
The Dayton agreement was rigid where it concerned the limits to BiH self-rule but 
extremely flexible in relation to the powers which international actors could exercise over 
independent state (Chandler, 2004). The second High Representative has confirmed this 
in his interview to local magazine: ’’if you read Dayton very carefully Annex 10 even 
gives me the possibility to interpret my own authorities and powers’’ (Westendorp, 
1997).  
The pattern of ad hoc and arbitrary extensions of international regulatory authority was 
initially set by the PIC itself as it rewrote its own powers and those of the High 
Representative at successive PIC meetings. The most important of these was Bonn 
conference in December 1997. 
Paragraph XI.2 of the Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held in Bonn 
on 9 and 10 December 1997 broadened the High Representative’s role and authorities. In 
                                                 
1 OHR website   7 
mentioned paragraph the PIC welcomed the High Representative’s intention to use his 
final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian 
Implementation of the Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of any 
difficulties as aforesaid “by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary” on certain 
issues including (under sub-paragraph (c) thereof) “measures to ensure implementation of 
the Peace Agreement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities as well as the 
smooth running of the common institutions".
2 
 
Since December 1997 High Representatives adopted tens decisions from very broad 
diapason.
3 The second High Representative explained the situation: ’’You do not [have] 
power handed to you on a platter. You just seize it, if you use this power well no-one will 
contest it (Rodriguez, 1998).’’ 
 
In table below we can see total number of the High representative adopted decisions. 
 





1  29 90 86 54 153  96 158  91 
Source: OHR website 
 
2.2.2 Political dependency 
 
It would be unfair to say that the international community and the High Representative 
were simply dictating decisions for implementation by local institutions. However, the 
international community involvement in BiH was so significant that one cannot discuss 
the resolution of crises and the post-war reconstruction of Bosnia without mentioning its 
role. Unfortunately, however, with their marginalized roles, local politicians based their 
election strategies and day-to-day behavior on nationalistic rhetoric instead of developing 
serious economic and reconstruction programs. This can be easily understood, though, 
since there is almost no need for them to think about economic issues: the World Bank 
and IMF will do that for them at the macroeconomic level, and other international 
institutions will act at a lower, microeconomic level. Even if local politicians want to do 
something on their own, they have to ask these foreign institutions for approval. One 
example being that governments in BiH cannot increase or decrease pensions, or 
introduce a tax policy without the World Bank’s agreement (Omanovic, 2005). 
 
                                                 
2 Ibid 
3  Decisions relating to State Symbols and State-Level Matters and Constitutional Issues, Decisions in the 
Economic Field, Decisions in the Field of Judicial Reform, Decisions relating to the Federation, Mostar and 
Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, Removals and Suspensions from Office, Media Restructuring Decisions by 
the HR, Decisions in the field of Property Laws, Return of Displaced, Persons and Refugees and 
Reconciliation and Decisions relating to individuals indicted for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia   8 
Representatives of individual donor agencies also emphasized correlation between 
powers of OHR and domestic responsibility for the reforms. ’’ The extensive powers 
vested in OHR have limited the BiH politicians’ ownership of and accountability for the 
reform process. OHR’s role as reformer and its pressure for quick passage of reforms 
stifle the vibrant political debate that would otherwise force local leaders to forge 
consensus and take responsibility for the reforms’’ (USAID, 2006). 
 
Although assistance efforts were provided in volatile and highly politicized environment 
where local parties have competing interests and differing degrees of support for the 
peace process, international community should not have allowed creation of political 
dependency in BiH. 
Local politicians’ political dependency and unwillingness to accept responsibility is 
pervading whole system because they are aware that the international community will 
make all important political and economic decisions for them if they fail to do so for any 
reason. Political parties use this as a tool with voters. While local politicians complain 
that the international community is not allowing them to do the job they were elected to 
do, when it comes to making difficult decisions, they try to avoid any responsibility by 
stalling until the international community steps in to make a final decision. If a decision 
is viewed positively afterwards, local political parties will try to take a credit for it, but if 
it is poorly received, they can blame the international community (Omanovic, 2005). 
 
The fact that overall guidance of the reconstruction process rested, at the apex, on PIC 
and the OHR, which had final authority over all civilian aspects of the agreement, made 
them accountable for results of the reconstruction process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
1.3 Aid coordination and management 
 
Concerning the overall aid program in BiH, the leadership was shared between the World 
Bank and the EU, which cooperated with the Bank in organizing and co-chairing the 
donor conferences. The governments of BiH, at what ever level, have not been actively 
involved in aid coordination (OED, 2004). 
 
The First Donor Conference for Bosnia was held in December 20-21—barely five weeks 
after the end of the conflict. 
The mobilization of assistance for BiH reconstruction was successful, but donor 
cooperation much less so, despite lip service and generally good personal relationships. A 
particular source of tension was that OHR and the EU had political mandates in BiH, 
whereas the World Bank only an economic mandate. Thus, the OHR sometimes wanted 
to condition aid on political steps, or design sector programs to achieve political 
objectives that were beyond Bank’s mandate. ’’ The Council (PIC) reminds the 
authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that economic assistance by the international 
community remains strictly conditional upon compliance with the Peace Agreement and 
subsequent obligations. The Council reconfirms its determination to apply conditionality   9 
to international reconstruction assistance, both by excluding non-compliant 
municipalities from reconstruction as well as by applying positive measures.’’
4 
 As explained later, in light of the diversity of donor interests and procedures, an attempt 
was made by the Bank to improve the coherence of assistance by designing a full set of 
sectoral interventions (projects), consistent with an overall blueprint for reconstruction, to 
serve as receptacles for donor resources. 
Each sectoral project was managed by a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) working with 
the relevant counterpart BiH agency. Some donors did channel their assistance through 
the PIUs, but many did not. 
The overall coordination for each sector was to be provided by 11 sector task forces, with 
each task force chaired by a different lead donor. Because the World Bank chaired only 
the economic policy task force (co chaired by the IMF), it was unable to exercise the 
same facilitating and coordinating role at sector level that it had exercised in organizing 
donor conferences and mobilizing funds. The 11 sectoral task forces were instead 
supposed to be coordinated by the Economic Task Force (ETF), chaired by OHR. The 
role of the ETF in aid coordination, however, remained loose and ambiguous, and so did 
the relationship between the timing of the political agenda and that of the reconstruction 
program. 
ETF, which included all aid agencies, met infrequently, and was too large to be effective 
(OED, 2004). 
The Bank intentionally chaired only one task force in order to avoid appearing heavy-
handed. However, its representatives on the task forces were active and, in some cases, 
the de facto shadow chair. Still, these complicated arrangements were not conducive to 
clear responsibility and accountability, and gave bilateral donors neither a positive nor a 
negative incentive to act in concert. Moreover, some of the sector lead donors proved 
unwilling or unable to exercise a robust coordinating role. Not surprisingly, several 
donors opted to act independently—in project selection, choice of local interlocutor, and 
procurement and fiduciary procedures.  
 As often the case, the fragmentation of donor efforts mirrored the fragmentation in the 
recipient government. World Bank staff and country management did try to persuade 
donors to contribute to a common fund, but convinced only three small bilaterals.  
The main factor for this reluctance was, in all probability, the fact that over the past 
decade, the mandate of aid has been extended significantly (Uvin, 2003). 
In BiH case, the unusual weight of political and security elements in most donors’ 
agendas impeded coordination between donors. For example, some observers argued that 
Germany's objective to repatriate Bosnian refugees and reduce the budgetary burden of 
asylum seekers frequently collided with what other donors thought was a prior need for 
adequate preparation in housing and other areas (Campo, 2003). 
In report from International Crisis Group five main problems associated with 
international community presence in BiH were emphasized: lack of a shared strategic 
vision; uncoordinated leadership; duplication and lack of communication; personality 
clashes and cross-cutting institutional interests; and ineffectual management of economic 
reform (ICG, 2001).  
. 
                                                 
4 OHR website, report from 1998   10 
Another important shortage from the outset of reconstruction process was non existence of 
the aid management agency (AMA). 
The AMA of the recipient government is the bridge from donors to government. The 
fundamental strategic challenge of post-conflict reconstruction is the reconciliation between 
immediate urgencies and longer-term sustainability. 
In most cases, the government is extremely weak during the immediate post-conflict period. 
Thus, the agency must not only interface with donors and regulate aid traffic, as in steady-
state situations, but also help formulate the reconstruction program, serve as proto-
government, and implement directly a number of activities. 
Given the logic of BiH political architecture, strong aid management from the center was out 
of the question. Indeed, there were essentially three parallel aid administration and 
implementation systems, one for each nationality, going through three de facto separate 
budget systems, and three separate debt and cash management systems and accounts (Campo, 
2003). 
When UNDP launched project with the goal of aid management in 2002, signal was sent 
that problems with coordination of development resources existed long after beginning of 
the reconstruction process.  
’’The Project's overall objective is to establish the capacity at the various levels of 
Government and put in place a suitable framework and mechanism within the 
government structures, to undertake the management and coordination of development 
resources for their efficient and effective use in order to achieve the development 
objectives of the country as they become clearer in the national and sectoral development 
strategies, such as the PRSP (UNDP, 2004).’’ 
Creation of the Board of the Principals in 2002 confirmed the existing notion that 
coordination between various members of international community was not on desired 
level. ’’Following an extensive study carried out by the Office of the High Representative 
at the request of the Peace Implementation Council the coordinating structure of the 
International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina was "streamlined" in 2002 so as to 
eliminate overlapping effort and responsibilities and increase effectiveness. As part of 
this process a Board of Principals was established, under the chairmanship of the High 
Representative, to serve as the main coordinating body of International Community 
activity in BiH. The Board of Principals meets once a week in Sarajevo. Its permanent 
members are OHR, EUFOR, NATO HQ Sarajevo, OSCE, UNHCR, EUPM and the 
European Commission. International financial institutions such as the World Bank, the 
IMF and the UNDP are also regular participants at the Board of Principals.’’
5 
Knowing that coordination and management of development resources by governments 
of the receiving countries is central to the success of development cooperation (WB 
1998), BiH was in unfavorable situation from the beginning of reconstruction period.  
 
Currently the mechanism for coordination and management of development resources 
consists of four units. 
According to the Law on Ministries and other State Institutions, coordination of 
development assistance is shared between the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
                                                 
5 OHR website   11 
Relations (MoFTER) and the Directorate for European Integration (DEI). MoFTER has 
responsibility for the coordination of all external assistance except that of the European 
Union, which is coordinated by the DEI. Each Entity has a Development Coordination 
Unit (DCU):  in the RS it was established in the Ministry of Economic Relations and 
Coordination-MoERC in April 2002, and in the FBiH in the Ministry of Finance-MoF, 
since February 2003 (UNDP, 2004). 
 
Although government representatives should eagerly embrace any incentive related to 
increase in aid effectiveness, BiH still has not signed the Paris Declaration. The Paris 
Declaration, endorsed on 2 March 2005, is an international agreement to which over one 
hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials adhered and committed 
their countries and organizations to continue and increase efforts in harmonization, 
alignment and managing aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators 
(DAC, 2005).   
 
3. Official Development Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
3.1 General notes 
 
After explanation of system through which aid funds were disbursed and identification of 
key actors and owners of reconstruction process we can start explication of sectoral 
distribution of aid funds and effects they have caused. In the situation where high quality 
analyses on this topic from Bosnian researchers are scarce, we have to predominantly rely 
on World Bank studies. The World Bank's research is widely disseminated and respected 
among many important audiences. A survey of 271 high-level policymakers (mainly 
senior civil servants) in 36 developing and transition countries found that 84 percent of 
respondents used Bank analytical reports; respondents rated the Bank their most 
important information source out of a list of 17 domestic and international organizations; 
and the majority of respondents considered the Bank's work "technically sound, relevant 
and objective" (WB, 2000a). Although there are concerns about the conflicts of interest 
underlying the Bank’s role as analyst and lender (Wade, 2002), significant dose of 
objectivity was presented in World Bank studies related to reconstruction period in BiH.   
 
Figures for aid funds used in this paper are obtained from The International Development 
Statistics online database (IDS/o) which includes the Development Assistance Committee 
online (DAC/o) and the Creditor Reporting System online (CRS/o). The reason for using 
this database for analysis of donor activity in BiH is explained in Appendix 1. 
 
Term aid, often used in this paper, relates to Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
which is defined as grants or loans to countries and territories which are: 
(a) undertaken by the official sector; 
(b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective;   12 
(c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25% 
(calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent) ]
6 (DAC, 2000) 
Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded from ODA and will be 
discussed additionally in this paper. Data on the amounts disbursed
7 each year are 
available at the activity level for some, but not all, donors.  Consequently, most analyses 
have to be undertaken on a commitment basis
8, what we will do for sectoral analysis in 
this paper.  
 
 
3.2 How much? 
 
Overall war damage has been estimated at 50-70 billion dollars, illustrating what a huge 
task of reconstruction awaited. 
“Three- to Four-Year Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program” (WB, 1995) was 
endorsed by international donors as a means of rebuilding the country and cementing 
peace. Setting out an external financing requirement of $5.1 billion, the program had 4 
challenging goals: 
•  Reconstruction of war damaged physical assets 
•  Jump-starting economic recovery 
•  Attracting home the millions of refugees and displaced 
•  Building a framework for sustainable growth. 
 
While modifications were made as the program evolved, these goals have remained 
consistent throughout.  
In Tables 1 and 2 we can see that international donors committed over $ 4.2 billion and 
disbursed over $ 3.6 billion of Official Development Assistance through 1996-1999 
period. 
Total commitments of Official Development Assistance (ODA) exceeded $ 7.25 billion 
and disbursement exceeded $ 6.8 billion from 1996 to 2004 (Table 1, 2).  
The biggest donors were European Commission, United States and World Bank with 
credit lines under IDA terms. They committed $ 3.9 billion from 1996 to 2004, more then 
all other donors did together. In Appendix 2 you can find committed funds by single 
donors and each year from 1996 to 2004.  
                                                 
6 The grant element in the ODA definition is a mathematical assessment of the financial terms of a 
transaction or set of transactions4. It is the difference between the face value of a loan and the present value 
(calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent) of the service payments the borrower will make overthe 
lifetime of the loan, expressed as a percentage of the face value 
7 A disbursement is the placement of resources at the disposal of a recipient country or agency, or 
in the case of internal development-related expenditures, the outlay of funds by the official sector. 
 
8 A commitment is a firm written obligation by a government or official agency, backed by the 
appropriation or availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under 
specified financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient country or 
a multilateral agency. Members unable to comply with this definition should explain the definition that 
they use. Commitments are considered to be made at the date a loan or grant agreement is signed or the 
obligation is otherwise made known to the recipient   13 
It is important to note that over 18.6% of all committed (1.35 billion) and 17.3% (1.175 
billion) of all disbursed funds were in the form of technical cooperation. Taking into 
account that technical co-operation is the provision of know-how in the form of 
personnel, training, research and associated costs we can conclude that almost one fifth of 
the recorded ODA never reached BiH frontier.   
 
 
Table 1: ODA Commitments 
Years 
Amount ($ Million)  
1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Grants  806.28 839.74 780.07 1087.23 645.79 469.82 402.82 477.18 442.33
of which – AF Interest 
Subsidies  - - - - - 10.65 - - -
Loans and Other Long 
Term Capital  205.6 86.65 54.64 16.18 55.14 126.94 109.33 52.73  238.59
Total ODA (OA) 
Commitments  1023.34 948.23 967.46 1276.32 702.38 612.33 512.37 531.18 681.56
Type 
of which – Technical 
Co-operation  194.58 50.06 286.78 243.84 48.86 122.12 103 142.9  157.33
Source: IDS/o 
 
Table 2: ODA Disbursement 
Years 
Amount ($ Million)  
1996 1997 1998 1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
ODA  (OA)  Total  Net  844.75 861.91 905.2  1040.33 737.08 639.18 563.47 540.3  683.54 
ODA  (OA)  Grants,  Total  729.13 787.1  741.46 926.84  673.58 554.05 447.7  468.21 435.42 
Debt  Forgiveness  Grants  8.31  20.58 -  176.19 124.9 4.25  3.59  24.02 3.59 
AF  Interest  Subsidies  3.44  - - -  - 10.65  - - - 
ODA  (OA)  Loans  Extended  115.62  74.81 163.74  113.49 66.01 88.09 121.14  76.07 252.36 
Reorganized  debt  - - - 13.87  - 0.33  - - - 
ODA  (OA)  Loans  Received  - - - -  -2.51  -2.96  -5.36  -3.98  -4.24 
ODA (OA) Loans Total Net  115.62  74.81  163.74  113.49  63.5  85.13  115.77  72.09  248.12 
Equity  investment  -  1.04 0.13 -  0.18 0.22 -  0.2  1.77 
Technical  Cooperation  93.46  86.3  242.94 105.15  103.29 123.09 122.72 151.69 146.64 
Development Food Aid  7.61  22.54  25.8  8.35  22.21  30.49  7.43  6.22  8.52 
Emergency  Aid  300.65 354.52 171.93 175  48.92  81.1  30.43  18.56  38.62 
Interest  received  -  -0.9  1.27  -8.59  -3.74 -5.56 -4.19 -5.18 -9.15 
Type 
ODA  (OA)  Imputed  Multilateral  118.08 110.79 145.29 106.91  198.67 188.05 204.64 178.3  268.5 
Source: IDS/o 
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Grants
9 were dominant form of ODA commitments in BiH, with 82% ($5.95 billion) of 
total aid from 1996 to 2004.  
During emergency period
10 share of ODA in Gross National Income (GNI) was 
persistently above 20 percent (Table 3). Although this share has dropped largely since 
then, ODA still constitutes significant part of GNI.  
ODA per capita for emergency period was the highest in modern history of post-conflict 




Table 3: ODA and GNI 
Amount ($ Million, $, % )  
1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
ODA/OA per Capita ($)  231.76 230.58 247.8 279.28 194.94 168.29 147.2  141 178.19
 








Table 4: Average Annual per Capita ODA (disbursement) for Post - Conflict Countries 
Country name and years   
 Total cumulative   
amount, US$ million   
Average population 
million   
  Per capita annual  
average, US$   
 Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996–99)     3,652   3.7     246.3   
 West Bank and Gaza (1994–97)     2,112     2.5     214.5   
 Rwanda (1994–97)   2,115     5.9     89.0   
 Eritrea (1994–97)     589     3.6     40.6   





3.3 ODA impact on macroeconomic situation 
 
Have those significant funds disbursed to BiH created macroeconomic stability and self-
sustaining growth?  
                                                 
9 Grants are transfers in cash or in kind for which no legal debt is incurred by the recipient. 
10 Period 1996-1999   15 
According to World Bank reports the answer for the first question is positive while for 
the second rather negative (WB, 2005). 
The very important thing that should be kept in mind when considering BiH economic 
indicators is that the statistical data on those indicators are still not reliable. As a result of 
the application of the different methodologies on data collection and processing in BiH 
entities, the system was not capable producing any country-wide data for a prolonged 
period.  
A State-level Agency for Statistics (BHAS) was established in 1998, with the strong 
support of the international community, and with the coordination of statistical activities 
as its primary mandate. Because of the lack of any enforcement powers, the BHAS failed 
until recently to reform the system, let alone to produce reliable consolidated statistics. 
Following intense pressure from the international community, a State-level Law on 
Statistics was adopted in early 2003, and the existing Entity-level Laws have been 
harmonized with it. The Law provides for mandatory data reporting, cooperation and 
methodological harmonization requirements for the Entities. 
 
During the emergency period, BiH experienced exceptionally high rates of economic 
growth (Table 5). A simple analysis, without consideration of starting base, would 
include this economy into the fastest growing ones in the world. In keeping with that, 
London’s The Economist ranked BiH the first in its 2005 report according to the criterion 
of real GDP growth in last decade. However, the initial economic growth was primarily 
the result of large ODA funds disbursed for reconstruction in BiH and low starting base, 
more than investment activity within the country. 
Currently, BiH gross domestic product is still rather low compared to its value before the 
war, as well as to the economy capacities. Despite the generally positive growth trend, 
the living standard of around 19,5% of the population of BiH is estimated to be below the 
general poverty line, while another third is vulnerable to fall into poverty in case of an 
income shock (WB, 2002). 
Decisive role in slowing consumer price inflation to single digits and below one percent 
during 2002-2004 had strict adherence to the currency board arrangement (CBA) 
introduced in 1997. The choice of the CBA as an exchange and monetary regime has 
been well justified in the quest for institutional and financial stability in BH’s post-
conflict environment. An almost exclusively rules-based regime was also best tailored for 
BH’s peculiar political and administrative set-up where decision-making remains the 
outcome of complex interactions and compromises (WB, 2005). Although domestic 
credit as a ratio to GDP is still lagging behind other transitional countries, trends shown 
in Table 5 signal that the CBA has not been a constraint to credit growth in BH to date. 
Outstanding growth in the first phase after the end of the war was accompanied by large 
fiscal deficits. Huge ODA and recovery in domestic revenue collection triggered parallel 
increases in recurrent spending, especially in public sector wages. As shown in Table 5, 
fiscal stabilization efforts led to the elimination of the fiscal deficit. Significant decrease 
in total spending, from close to 70 percent of GDP in 1999 to 50 percent in 2004, 
occurred primarily due to a decline in externally-financed public investment and a shift 
from arrear accumulation to repayment.  
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Table 5: Key economic indicators 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
(annual percentage change) 
 Real GDP growth    62.6  29.9  17.6  9.5 5.4 4.3 5.3 4.4  6.2 
 CPI Inflation    -  11.5  5.6  -  0.4  3.0 5.1 3.2 0.3 0.6  0.3 
Growth of industrial 
production     23  14  11  -5  12  3  12.4 
(in percent of GDP unless otherwise noted) 
General Government 
revenues        59.9 55.4 53.8 49.7 49.6 48.9. 
General Government 
spending        67.7 64.5 58.8 53.4 51.0  50.0 
Balance(accruals,incl. grants)        -7.8 -9.0 -4.9 -3.7 -1.3  -1.1 
 Current account balance    n/a  n/a  - 8.4  - 9.1  - 17.5  - 20.0  - 26.5  - 22.4  - 24.4 
 Gross Investment    21.0 20.1 20.0 21.0 20.6 18.8 20.4 19.9  20.3 
 National Savings    -18  -5  1  12.8 8.1 2.2 -1.3 2.2  3.0 
 Foreign exchange reserves 
(In months of imports)    1.1 0.4 0.7 1.9 2.1 5.1 4.5 5.3  6.1 
External debt      65.5 41.6 39.8 37.7 33.3  31.1 
 External debt service (In 
percent of exports of goods 
and services)    53  16  17 10.1  7.5 6.1 9.2 8.2  6.5 
Broad Money (M2)      24,1 24,6 42,6 43,5 44,7  52,6 
Credit to Non-Government 
Sector     
30,5 29,7 30,2 36,2 41,3  45,3 
(million US$) 
 Exports  of goods   336 595 697 649 809 851 952  1,271  1611 
 Imports of goods    1,941 2,400 2,781 2,568 2,533 2,708 3,233 3,890  4578 
 Trade Balance in goods    -1,605 -1,805 -2,084 -1,919 -1,724 -1,857 -2,281 -2,619  -3033 
Gross Official Reserves         472  482  1.234 1.187 1.604  2.195 
FDI      67  177 146 119 265 381  497 
Source: BH authorities; IMF (World Economic Outlook database, Fourth SBA review, 
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BH is currently classified as a moderately indebted middle-income country. Prudent 
external borrowing policies and successive rescheduling agreements, as well as the 
regularization and cancellation of old debts denominated in non-convertible currencies 
accompanied with moderate GDP growth enabled reduction in external debt from 66 
percent of GDP in 1999 to 35 percent by the end of 2004.
11 
 
Predictably, post-conflict growth was accompanied in the initial phase by large external 
deficits. Large imports fueled by reconstruction were only partially offset by exports, 
which, although growing quite rapidly, started from a very low base. While exports have 
grown faster than merchandise imports in euro terms since 2002, they still account for 
only 10 percent of GDP. The composition of merchandise imports, equivalent to one-
third of GDP, has more recently shifted towards non-reconstruction goods, largely 
consumer goods and oil products. Domestic demand has been bolstered by sizeable 
increases in credit to households as well as by continued high levels of workers’ 
remittances and other private transfers (WB, 2005).  
There are, however, many other worrying trends besides external imbalances, such as 
continued high unemployment
12, growing informal sector
13, low domestic savings and 
investment and declining rate of growth of industrial production (Table 5). While there 
appears to have been an upswing in private foreign investment inflows in the past two 
years, the level is still far below that needed to substantially increase the growth rate.  
 
In the 2003 Feasibility Study on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s preparedness to negotiate a 
SAA with the EU, the Commission concluded that: 
“In general, Bosnia and Herzegovina has developed sound macroeconomic policies and 
made some progress with structural reform. Nevertheless, risks to macroeconomic 
stability remain. Against the background of declining foreign assistance, high current 
account deficits and a persistent lack of self-sustaining domestic growth (hampered by 
weak corporate governance and labour market rigidities) could endanger currency 
stability with potential effects on inflation and the sustainability of debt servicing. On the 
                                                 
11 After normalizing its relations with the IFIs in the immediate aftermath of the war, BH renegotiated its 
debt with official bilateral creditors, reaching an agreement with the Paris Club in October 1998. The debt 
renegotiated included the entire “allocated debt” (debts owed or guaranteed by entities located in BH’s 
territory) and 13.2 percent of the SFRY unallocated debt. The Paris Club agreed to reduce this debt by 67 
percent in net present value (NPV) terms and to reschedule the remaining obligations over 30 years with a 
six-year grace period on principal repayment for commercial type credits, and over 33 years with no grace 
period for Official Development Assistance (ODA). Similarly, in December 1998, BH finalized an 
agreement with the London Club which became effective the following January. The London Club forgave 
some 73 percent of the debt on a present discounted value basis while the remaining $400 million was to be 
divided into two components: a “basic amount” of some $147.8 million and a “performance amount” for 
the rest. The basic amount was rescheduled over 20 years with a seven-year grace period. The performance 
amount would fall due once and if BH GDP per capita reaches US$2,800 (measured at 1997 prices) for two 
consecutive years before 2018 (WB, 2005). 
12 Official unemployment rate is one of the highest in the world, persistently averaging 
around 40%. According to World Bank analysis unemployment rate is significantly lower 
but still dangerously high-around 20%  (WB, 2005b).  
13 According to World Bank 42% of labour force was employed in informal sector in 2004   18 
fiscal front, public expenditure still concentrates on current rather than investment 
spending. Also, external public debt is on a downward trend, but domestic public debt, 









Problems with donor coordination explained earlier also made difficult precise and 
complete sectoral analysis of ODA. Coverage ratio is an indicator presenting percentage 
of all ODA for which final destination, sector is known. That indicator is 80% for period 
1996-2004 in BiH, what means that we do not know where 20% or $1.34 billion of 
committed funds went. Coverage ratios are particularly low for years immediately after 
the conflict (Table 6). This fact also proves our stance that AMA, which would record all 




Table 6: Coverage ratios 
Years   
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 
Coverage 
Ratio 




DAC guidelines defined 9 broad sectors in which every donor activity can be recorded. 
Sectors that received the greatest portion of committed funds in BiH were Emergency 
assistance and reconstruction with$1.184 billion, Economic infrastructure with $1.033 
billion and Social infrastructure and services with $1.934 billion (Table 7). Around 90% 
of technical assistance went to Economic infrastructure and Social infrastructure and 
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Table 7: ODA commitments by sector 
 
Amount in millions of USD 
1996-2004 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
TOTAL  5.907.511  499.916 707.227 753.672 1137.03
1  693.455 558.356 477.264 483.198 597.392
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE 
AND RECONSTRUCTION  1.184.896  165.892 368.037 132.428 230.909 90.035  81.892 66.09 69.215  46.488 
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE & 
SERVICES  1.934.774  130.688 113.075 193.08 196.167 195.163 220.339  190.144 275.707 420.411
ECONOMIC 
INFRASTRUCTURE  1.033.337  58.124  151.89 287.297 251.644 84.192 109.899  114.987 38.746  88.488 
PRODUCTION  SECTORS  205.410  13.298 24.904  41.25  23.644 13.367 17.364 30.689  23.63  17.264 
MULTISECTOR 564.901  106.298 0.79  70.921  148.204 64.214  92.231  64.634  9.993  8.406 
COMMODITY AID / GENERAL 
PROG. ASS.  217.592  8.541 15.626 25.69 86.262 15.37 32.838  4.92  40.106 8.524 
ACTION RELATING TO DEBT  457.837  -  20.581  -  190.06  226.563 0.334  -  20.633  - 
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF 
DONORS  4.220  -  0.127 2.294 0.755  3.32  0.268 0.746 0.971 1.922 







UNALLOCATED/UNSPECIFIED  47.101  17.075  12.198  0.693 9.388 1.191 0.064 1.508 2.528 3.213 
Source: IDS/o 
 
Table 8: Technical assistance by sector 
 
Amount in millions of USD 
1996-2004 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
TOTAL  1.070.101 88.550 28.323 37.487 247.352 120.715 108.476 94.993 143.652 200.553
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE & 
SERVICES  682.654 51.308 26.770 24.643 66.021 55.204 98.582 70.636 108.638 180.852
ECONOMIC 
INFRASTRUCTURE  298.370 4.326 0.663 8.855 167.791 59.753 3.140  17.299 25.241 11.965
PRODUCTION SECTORS 
 14.395  0.414 0.234 1.340 2.547 2.012 0.673  1.094 4.350 3.052
MULTISECTOR 44.984  15.496 0.104 2.187 10.299 0.547 3.530  5.174 4.004 4.294
COMMODITY AID / GENERAL 
PROG. ASS.  1.489  1.489 - - - - -  - - -
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 







UNALLOCATED/UNSPECIFIED 15.517  15.517 0.141 0.462 0.165 0.282 0.064 0.79 0.745 0.240
Source: IDS/o 
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4.2 Emergency assistance 
 
Period from 1996 to 1999 can be named reconstruction period primarily because 
extraordinary high share of ODA was directed in Emergency assistance and 
reconstruction sector (Table 9). Striking decrease in ODA in 2000 represented the end of 
post-conflict reconstruction and start of new, development, EU oriented era.   
ODA committed to this sector was primarily directed toward refugees and displaced 
persons.  Sub-sector ‘’Other Emergency and Distress Relief’’ can be, in BiH case, 
renamed Aid for return while Reconstruction relief is representing ODA committed for 
reconstruction of refugees/displaced persons housing units.    
 
Table 9: EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION 
 
Amount in millions of USD 
1996-2004  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND 
RECONSTRUCTION  1.184.896 165.89 368.03 132.42 230.90 90.035 81.892  66.09 69.215 46.488
   1 Emergency Food Aid  15.162 0.54 2.064 0.982 0.041 - 5.004 6.964 1.130 -
   2 Other Emergency and Distress Relief  773.489 138.31 258.72 100.60 152.77 29.952 43.975 19.487 14.742 14.901
   3 Reconstruction relief  430.297 27.029 81.246 26.369 78.089 60.083 32.913 39.638 53.343 31.587




During the war about 250.000 persons got killed and about 17.000 were reported missing. 
Besides, since the beginning of the war until the GFAP was signed some 2,2 million 
people had fled from their pre-war homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which makes more 
than 50% of the prewar domicile population. Out of that number 1.2 million people asked 
for refugee protection in more then 100 countries all over the world, while at the same 
time more than million persons were displaced within the country. 
Donors committed over $770 million for direct support of return process with 
overwhelming majority of ODA committed in 1996-1999 period when 645.000 persons 
(350.000 refugees and 295.000 displaced) returned to their prewar homes which makes 
around 65% of the total number of returns to Bosnia and Herzegovina since the Dayton 
Peace Agreement (Table10).  
Results for minority returns14 were not that successful in the years immediately 
following conflict but somewhat improved later (Table 10a).    
Today almost half a million persons who had left Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 
from 1992 to 1995 and who were recorded as refugees from BiH, are still residing in 
some 40 countries all over the world. 
 
                                                 
14 Minority returns is a purely technical term referring to persons who have 
returned to their pre-conflict municipalities, currently dominated by (an)other 
constituent people(s) of BiH. 
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Data obtained from Ministry of human rights and refugees shows us following: 
Numerical indicators on migration of refugees from BiH: 
•  Repatriated in BiH 480.000(40%) 
•  Resettled in third countries 220.000(18%) 
•  Residing abroad 500.000(42%) of which 
1.  Integrated in host countries 400.000(80%) 
2.  In need of durable solution 100.000(20%) 
 
Table 10: Total number of returns to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Source: UNHCR; IOM; Ministries for Refugees; Deportation movements; Municipal Authorities; 
OHR Brcko District; DPs Associations and NGOs. 
 
 
                   Table 10a: Total minority returns 
Year   Federation 




District   Total BiH  
1996 - 1997   44,398   1,125     45,523  
1998   32,605   8,586     41,191  
1999   27,987   13,020     41,007  
2000   34,377   27,558   5,510   67,445  
2001   46,848   40,253   4,960   92,061  
2002   51,814   41,345   8,952   102,111  
2003   25,130   18,051   1,687   44,868  
2004   5,881   8,045   273   14,199  
2005   2,807   3,008     5,815  
Total :   271,847  160,991  21,382  454,22 
                        Source: UNHCR 
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Quite a small number of them are still in need for durable solutions, which means granted 
citizenship, permanent residence, asylum, working permission or other legal permission 
to stay in host countries. 
 
The real number of displaced persons was unknown for a prolonged period.  
The first, comprehensive, official registration of displaced persons in BiH was made by 
the end of 2000, when 556.214 displaced persons were registered (183.355 families) 
(MOHRR, 2005). 
 
Although many displaced persons have found permanent solutions after being registered, 
in the first place through return but other ways as well, the systematic de-registration of 
such persons have not been performed. 
After it was found necessary to determine the real number of displaced persons in BiH, as 
one of the most important assumptions for successful continuation of activities in terms 
of implementation of the Annex VII of the GFAP, in 2004 the Ministry for Human Rights 
and Refugees, the Ministry for Refugees and Displaced Persons of RS, the FBiH Ministry 
for Displaced Persons and Refugees and Government of District Brčko of BiH, in co-
operation with the UNHCR have signed joint “Protocol on Implementation of the Process 
of Revision of Numerical Situation and Status of Displaced Persons in BiH”. 
According to Ministry of human rights and refugees report from 2005 there were over 
180.000 displaced persons in BiH in 2005 (MOHRR, 2005). 
 
In addition to ODA $430 million for reconstruction of refuges/displaced persons housing 
units’ donors committed $295 million for reconstruction of ’’non-displaced’’ persons 
housing units (Table 9).
15 
Housing stock of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 consisted of more than a million 
housing units in 6.823 settlements (Table 11). 
In addition to demographic destructions the war also radically changed the housing sector 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In the period from 1992 to 1995 some 452.000 housing units were partially or completely 
destroyed which makes almost 40% the pre-war housing stock. Out of this number, 
around 80% of housing units were either destroyed or heavily damaged (Table 11).  
 
 
Table 11: Housing stock situation in 1995 
 
SOURCE: IMG (International Management Group), 1995 Census 
 
                                                 
15  Other social infrastructure Non technical assistance activities from IDS database    23 
 
Statistics generated on the basis of data verification in the central base by municipalities 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina indicate that the level of reconstruction of the housing fund 
reached almost 60% with some 260.000 reconstructed units up to the present, out of 
which more than two thirds were reconstructed from donations. 
The highest level of reconstruction of the housing fund is in the FBiH (66,70%), then in 
Brčko District of BiH (46,30%), and the lowest level is in the RS with around 
40%(Table12). 
 
Table 12: Housing stock situation 2005 
 
Source: Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, Report on (re)-registration of 
Displaced Persons in BiH, December 2005 
 
4.3 Economic infrastructure 
 
BiH’s prewar economic infrastructure was well-developed, and oriented to the needs of a 
socially-owned economy based largely on heavy industry. Many infrastructure facilities – 
such as bridges and telecommunications installations - became strategic targets during the 
war and were badly damaged by direct shelling. Years of lack of maintenance 
compounded this damage (WB, 1999).  Resources mobilized by donors in period 1996-
2004 in firm commitments of $1.2 billion (Table 13) – augmented by company own 
resources and private investment have brought significant progress in transport, electric 
power and telecommunications sector. Nevertheless, the pattern of degrading 
infrastructure owing to inadequate provision for maintenance is prevalent to some extent   24 
in all infrastructure and energy sectors. The problem stems from inadequate cost recovery 
through tariffs. However, the sheer scale of the investment backlog that can not be 
addressed by merely raising tariffs. These problems need to be addressed quickly to 
prevent what could eventually become serious service shortcomings that impact job-
creation and the overall attractiveness of BiH as an investment destination (WB, 2004). 
 
 
Table 13: ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Amount in millions of USD 
1996-2004 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
ECONOMIC 
INFRASTRUCTURE  1.185.267  58.124 151.890 287.297 251.644 84.192 109.899 114.987  38.746 88.488
   Transport & Storage  242.094 1.432 94.279 31.871 7.569 0.591 18.352  33.675 5.107 49.809
   Communications  26.760 4.564 1.033 12.578 4.229 0.466 0.091 2.344 2.012 0.849
   Energy  209.225  51.222 54.75 93.756 9.859 9.478 36.893 0.343 1.442 6.575
   Banking & Financial    
Services  179.922  0.203 1.221 123.857 1.970 3.956 31.867 6.231 5.610 5.210





Transport sector, designed around the needs of heavy industry suffered large-scale war 
damage. BiH’s well-developed road and bridge network and railway system were 
oriented to transporting the production output of metallurgy and other industries to 
neighboring republics and abroad. Urban transport services were not well developed. 
During the war more than 2,000 kilometers (km) of the main road network and 70 bridges 
(including all those connecting Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia) were destroyed, all 
railways lines were rendered inoperable, and the Sarajevo airport was closed to traffic. 
Compounding direct damage, little maintenance was done during the war (WB, 1999) 
Since the end of hostilities, the condition of the transport infrastructure has significantly 
improved, mainly through implementation of the Emergency Transport Reconstruction 
Project(ETRP) and Second Emergency Transport Reconstruction Project (SETRP), and 
Implementation Force/Stabilization Force activities to restore strategic infrastructure. 
Under these projects 2.200 km of roads and 58 bridges were reconstructed. 
In recent past there was widespread dissatisfaction amongst the population about the 
quality of local (i.e. municipal and regional) roads. Complaints about the low quality of 
roads top the list among all public services (WB, 2002a) – complaints being almost twice 
as high as the next priority/problem which includes concerns about security, public 
transport, water supply and sanitation. The priority would be local road upgrading and 
development – in some sense shifting from the current predominant focus on motorways 
and main roads.   25 
Relevant entity Ministries are now carrying out project through the World Bank Loan 
("Road Management and Safety Project") supposed to be finished in the end of the year 
2007, which comprised further reconstruction of cca 550 km of main roads in both of the 
Entities. 
Urgent repairs are needed on 10% of the main road network which accounts for 20% of 
the total road network in Bosnia – and where much of the reconstruction effort was 
focused. The condition of regional and local roads, which account for the remaining 80% 
of the total network in BiH is far worse. 
The road network in Bosnia has seen a 25% increase in the number of vehicles compared 
to the pre-conflict period in 1990, a more than doubling of freight and a 50% increase in 
passenger traffic since 1996. The increase in traffic has been accommodated on a network 
that has not been expanded. Traffic bottlenecks are emerging in some regions and 





As a strategic target during the war, the telecommunications infrastructure in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was crushed. Transmission and switching equipment, buildings, towers, and 
overhead cables were destroyed (WB, 1999). As of 1996, there were 472,000 main local 
telephone lines and 400 international lines, many in poor condition. This compared to 
about 676,000 local lines and 4,000 international lines before the war.
16 Most of the 
backbone transmission network, which was largely reliant on microwave facilities 
located on hilltops, was also completely destroyed. Poor service was compounded by lack 
of replacement parts, an exodus of skilled technicians, the loss or destruction of 
equipment documentation, and frequent power interruptions. In some areas, call 
completion rates dropped to 1-2% during busy periods, as compared to 35-38% prior to 
the war.  
 
The GFAP made the reconnection of the inter-Entity telecommunications network a basic 
requirement for the peace process in Annex 9. Formerly the core of the 
telecommunications network in Bosnia and Herzegovina was run by the PTT Company, 
established as a business system consisting of a general directorate with 13 regional PTT 
companies and employing 11,750 staff. The state-owned enterprise has since been 
divided into three companies with headquarters in Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which lead the 
Telecommunications Task Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has developed a master plan 
for this sector. Since 1996, the donor community has committed about ODA $27 million 
to reconstruct the telecommunications sector (Table 13).
17  In addition to donor financial 
assistance, operating surpluses of the telecom operators provided overwhelming majority 
of the investments in this sub-sector.  
                                                 
16 Sources: IMG Telecommunications Unit 
 
17 Significant EBRD loans are not included in ODA because they are provided with market interest rates   26 
Number of subscribers has increased rapidly after the war. (Table 14)  
Service quality has improved significantly. Switching and transmission capacity that was 
heavily damaged during the war has been replaced with modern equipment. 
 
Table 14: Telecommunication sector 
    1992  1996 1998 2005 
Nmb of fixed 
lines  695.962 472.188 636.658 1,026.855 
Total BiH  Nmb of 
mobile 
subscribers 
- - 50.000  1.618.565 
Nmb of fixed 






- - 50.000  776.783 
Nmb of fixed 
lines  242.916 186.192 225.625 347.834 
Telekom RS  Nmb of 
mobile 
subscribers 
- - - 571.782 
Nmb of fixed 
lines  100.286 46.615  84.675  130.000 
HT Mostar  Nmb of 
mobile 
subscribers 
- - - 270.000 




Bosnia and Herzegovina’s energy sector played a key role in the prewar economy, 
producing eight percent of the GDP. Twenty-five power plants (13 hydro and 12 thermal) 
generated 13,090 gigawatthours (GWh) of electricity (Table 15). The sector was oriented 
to meeting the demands of energy-intensive heavy industry located primarily in FBiH. 
Domestic coal production (80 percent of which was destined for the thermal plants) 
employed 26,000 workers, but coal was of poor quality and produced uneconomically. 
By war’s end, direct damage and inadequate maintenance had reduced electric power 
generation to less than half the prewar level and coal production had plummeted. From 
one state-owned power enterprise three companies had emerged – based in Sarajevo 
(Elektroprivreda BiH(EP BiH)), Mostar (Elektroprivreda Herceg Bosne(EP HB)) and 
Banja Luka(Elektroprivreda RS( EP RS)) – complicating efficient sharing of power 
supply (WB, 1999). 
With ODA over $209 million committed to this sub-sector production increased 
remarkably in post-war years, reaching its pre-war levels in 2004. (Table 15) 
Although production growth was outstanding many negative features characterized work 
of the power enterprises.  Reports of the Special Auditor appointed by the decision of the 
High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ralph 2003) revealed rather abnormal 
business practices. A good benchmark for the quality of business practices of the   27 
respective companies was the share of distribution losses in 2002: 10.4, 24.4, and 30.6 




Table 15 Production of electric energy in MWh 




7.733  8.766  9.586 10.500 10.406 11.430  10.791 












1 466   1 175   1 225   1 396   1 317    1 639      
Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, EPBIH, EPHZHB, ERS. 
 
 
4.3.3 Banking & Financial    Services 
 
Lack of confidence in the banking system, frozen foreign exchange deposits, and 
depressed income levels contributed to a very low post-war domestic savings rate and a 
weak banking system. The domestic banking sector has been virtually unable to 
intermediate credit. 
Given the importance of a well functioning banking system as a mobilizer of savings and 
intermediator of funds, the international community focused on four areas in order to 
bolster confidence in the banks with strengthening banking supervision and liquidating 
insolvent banks, instituting a deposit insurance scheme and privatizing solvent majority 
state owned banks and providing medium-and long- term funding for commercial banks 
on market criteria(WB, 1999). 
 
Measures have been taken to create a framework for banking supervision in line with 
international standards. A law on commercial banking was passed by the entities 
parliaments in 1998 covering licensing, supervision, liquidation of banks, and prescribed 
banking standards follow. The law helped eradicate the past abuses in the banking system 
that aroused from lending to insiders and to connected parties. With considerable 
international technical assistance entity banking agencies were formed in 1998 and 
currently there is incentive to transfer supervision on Central Bank. While strengthened 
licensing and supervision standards helped restoring public confidence in banks, a system 
of insuring deposits was essential for rapid and forceful recovery in confidence. 
In 1998, donors provided support for the development of a sound deposit insurance law. 
A scheme to insure deposits was introduced and directed at protecting small depositors 
from loss in the event of bank failure, discouraging runs on banks, and providing an 
efficient mechanism for disposing of insolvent banks. In late 1998, the FBiH and RS   28 
governments established their respective Bank Privatization Agency responsible for 
assuring that bank privatization deadlines are met and insolvent banks are liquidated. 
From approximately 50 in 1998, number of the banks decreased to 33 in 2004 (Table 16). 
Further consolidation is expected. 
 
 
Table 16: Number of banks in BiH 








According to EBRD, banking sector transition indicator
18 was 2.67 in 2004 (EBRD, 
2004), which is interpreted as being a typical value for this region. 
Non-bank financial institutions in BiH are in their infancy. The leasing and insurance 
sectors in particular require development and improved regulatory frameworks. 
 
4.3.4 Business & Other Services 
 
Initial reforms aimed to create friendly business environment were launched successfully 
in BH shortly after the end of the war. As we can see in Table 17, the EBRD indexes for 
BiH indicate major progress in “first-generation” reforms since 1996, most notably the 
near completion of price, foreign exchange and trade liberalization as well as of small 
scale privatization. 
However, progress in “second-generation” institutional reforms has been substantially 
weaker. International experience as well as empirical research on the trade and 
integration of transition economies demonstrates that price and domestic market 
liberalization alone are not sufficient to improve the economic performance and 
international integration of these countries (EBRD, 2003). 
Establishing a favorable investment climate is central to output expansion and building a 
basis for sustainable growth. With almost half billion dollars of ODA committed to 
development of business





                                                 
18 EBRD has developed a transition indicator for banking sector reform as an important international 
source of assessment. This indicator ranges from 1 to 4+, with 1 defined as little progress in financial sector 
reform and 4+ representing full convergence of banking laws and regulations with BIS standards and a full 
set of banking services.  
19 Majority of ODA for this sub-sector was in the form of technical assistance-$280 million   29 
Table 17: EBRD indicators 
Reform progress 
indicator 
1996 2000 2004 
 Initial reforms            
 Price liberalization     2.0    3.0    4.0  
 Foreign exchange 
and trade 
liberalization     1.0    3.0    3.7  
 Small-scale 
privatization     2.0    2.3    3.0  
            
 Second-generation 
reforms            
 Large-scale 
privatization     1.0    2.0    2.3  
 Enterprise reform     1.0    1.7    2.0  
 Competition policy     1.0    1.0    1.0  
 Infrastructure 
reform     1.3    2.0    2.3  
 Banking sector 
reform     1.0    2.3    2.7  
 Non-banking 
financial institutions     1.0    1.0    1.7  
 Legal extensiveness 
(company law)a    na    3.0    na  
Source: EBRD 
 
This is primarily because institutional framework for enterprise development and SME 
support in BiH remains weak and underdeveloped, when compared both with 
international best practices and with the institutional frameworks developed by other 
countries in South East Europe (OECD, 2005).  The country’s weak institutional 
framework deters local and foreign investors, and consequently diminishes the 
opportunities for enterprise development and economic growth. Entrepreneurs are 
reluctant to open or expand businesses where there is policy uncertainty, room for 
discretionary behavior and lack of transparency. Corruption and transactional difficulties 
in day-to-day business operations are also important deterrents.  
The persistence of soft budget constraints among privatized and state owned firms (as 
reflected in weak financial discipline, the accumulation of arrears, and the continued 
provision of subsidies) reflects the poor corporate governance structures that have 
emerged from the privatization program as well as continued dispersed ownership. The 
lack of a credible threat to exit also keeps loss-making firms on the market. As a result, 
many loss-making firms languish at low levels of activity and tie up assets that could 
otherwise be put to productive use while new private initiative struggles to emerge (WB,   30 
2005). Although business climate has improved since 1996, the business environment in 
BH is still perceived as investor-unfriendly. 
  
4.4 Social infrastructure and services 
 
This sector received the greatest portion of ODA from 1996 to 2004 ($1.934 billion) with 
aid flows reaching almost billion dollars in sub-sector Government and Civil Society 
(Table 18). 
 
Table 18: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES 
 
Amount in millions of USD 




1.934.77 130.69 113.08 193.08 196.17 195.16 220.34 190.14 275.71 420.41
Of which technical 
cooperation  682.65 51.31 26.77 24.64 66.02 55.20 98.58 70.64  108.64 180.85
   Education, Total  234.468 44.686 18.618 9.215 16.458 24.176 26.442 30.034 25.894 38.945
        a) Education, Level  
Unspecified  49.474 1.333 11.311 1.152 2.360 11.975 12.625 3.183 3.699 1.836
        b) Basic Education  17.713 0.159 0.166 0.131 0.923 2.027 2.217  11.469 0.413 2.000
        c) Secondary 
Education  13.192 0.236 0.809 0.113 0.160 0.065 0.230 0.802 1.426 11.766
       d) Post-Secondary 
Education  149.884 42.957 6.333 7.820 13.015 10.110 11.370 14.580 20.356 23.343
   Health, Total  127.777 5.297 33.178 7.501 32.278 8.564 8.281 7.913 1.822 22.943
      a) Health, General  51.122 2.291 20.677 5.143 6.794 3.307 1.518 2.084 0.407 9.308
      b) Basic Health  72.430 3.006 12.501 2.358 25.484 5.257 2.945 5.829 1.415 13.635
   Population Programmes  2.154 - - 0.023 - 0.578 0.177  1.031  1.123 -
   Water Supply & 
Sanitation  181.788 3.000 38.057 13.524 10.577 13.517 18.571  26.896  16.043 41.603
   Government & Civil 
Society  998.694 47.280 14.220 130.65








      a) Government and civil 




      b) Conflict, Peace and 







   Other Social 
Infrastructure & Services  389.112 30.425 9.002 32.162 52.989 49.963 48.562 17.348 51.708 96.953
Source: IDS/o 
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4.4.1 Education 
 
The war caused the disruption of education at all levels. Approximately 60 percent of all 
school buildings were damaged, destroyed, or requisitioned for military use; the teaching 
force was decimated and formal educational funding virtually ceased for three years. 
Despite these difficulties, the extraordinary efforts of parents, local governments, and aid 
agencies ensured that most children continued their education during the war (WB, 
1999). Following the end of hostilities, the education system has gradually been rebuilt.  
Most of the physical infrastructure was rebuilt in period 1996-1998 when about 840 
primary school buildings have been replaced or rehabilitated with external funding (about 
690 of 1,300 in the FBiH and 150 of 550 in RS), and about 130 kindergarten buildings 
(110 in the FBiH and 20 in RS). Donors also committed funds for the reconstruction of 
about 80 secondary schools (65 of 145 in the FBiH and 15 of 88 in RS) and for 
rehabilitation of major universities in Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla, and Banja Luka. Although 
initial operations focused on reconstruction, they also supported analytical work and 
included pilot components that prepared the ground for basic reforms to improve quality 
and accessibility of public education. 
Net primary and secondary school enrollment stood at 93% and 73% respectively in 2001 
(WB, 2001) - close to other EU accession countries (Table 19). 
 
Table 19: Education indicators 











































  10.431  10.792 
   
Graduated 
students 
    3.133 3.038 3.673 4.444 4.319    
Source: BHAS 
   
World Bank initiated in 2000 Education Development Project (EDP) sought to improve 
management in the sector by establishing institutions and tools such as the Standards and 
Assessment Agency, the Education Management Information System (EMIS), and the 
Council of Higher Education, which operate across Entities. These structures are 
important for improved performance of the education system. One of the priorities for the 
government in the near future will be adoption of state law on higher education which 
they failed too pass several times in recent past. Although majority of ODA was directed 
in it, tertiary education level is lagging significantly behind primary and secondary with 
24% enrollment rate. 
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4.4.2 Health 
 
Health status in Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorated severely during the war, and health 
care infrastructure suffered significant damage throughout the country. In addition, the 
unified pre-war health financing system was divided into three parts at the beginning of 
the war, further jeopardizing financial sustainability. Population displacements resulted in 
overpopulation in some areas. The resulting inadequacy of health services, plus 
overcrowding and unsanitary conditions for the internally displaced, resulted in increased 
incidence of communicable diseases (WB, 1999). 
In early post war period efforts focused primarily on preventing further deterioration of 
the overall health situation by providing emergency assistance (mainly the direct 
provision of essential goods and services) and additional assistance was provided to 
initiate the physical and functional rehabilitation of the health care delivery system (Table 
21). Later emphasis shifted toward formulation of sector policies and strategies for 
development in the medium term. 
The World Bank developed and introduced a new model of primary health care delivery 
through the Basic Health Project (BHP) initiated in 1999. This approach, developed in 
close partnership with the Ministries of Health of the Entities and pilot cantons, CIDA 
and Queens University, Canada, supported the staffing, training and operation of Family 
Medicine teams in pilot cantons in the FBH and pilot regions in the RS, to deliver more 
effective and higher quality primary health care services that are better focused on the 
health needs o f the population. 
This operation is highly relevant for BiH’s needs and appears to be achieving good 
results (WB, 2004a). 
Since the end of the conflict, the broad indicators of the health status of Bosnia’s 
population have improved substantially, to levels close to or better than pre-war, and well 
within the range of comparator countries. The infant mortality rate (IMR) has fallen 
steadily from 14.2 per 1000 in 1996 to 7 per 1000 in 2004 (Table 20). Life expectancy for 
men and women has risen to 71 and 75 years, respectively, slightly above pre-conflict 
levels, and also within the range of comparator countries (WB, 2001) 
 
Table 20: Demographic indicators 








6.9 7.5 7.9 7.7 8.1 8.0 7.9 8.3 8.5 
Natural 
increase 




14.0 12.4 11.0 10.1 9.7  7.6  9.4  7.6  7.2 
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Table 21 
Indicators  1991  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
  Number  of  hospitals  86  37 39 39 34 36 34 35 
  N u m b e r  o f  p r i m a r y  h e a l t h  c a r e  
units  1463 1488  1193 ... 1169  1194  1183  1216 
 Total number of hospital beds  1978  13977 14221 12211 12098  11799  11981 11603
Number of physicians, physical 
persons  (PP)  7027  5215 5388 5368 5443 5482 5576 5458 
Number  of  dentists  (PP)  1346  694 735 725 679 686 690 630 
Number  of  pharmacists  (PP)  811  403 359 380 350 372 363 370 
Number of nurses (PP)  20375  16506 14881 16943 16708  16995  17170 16899
Source: WHO on-line database 
 
 
4.4.3 Water Supply & Sanitation 
 
Municipal water supply and sewerage networks, which served 75 percent of the urban 
population before the war, were damaged by neglect. By 1996 half of the population no 
longer had 24-hour water supply and clogged sewer and drainage systems left areas 
flooded for extensive periods. Countrywide water leakage losses reached 50 percent. The 
quality of solid waste services was also severely impaired, with collection equipment 
sustaining extensive damage and access to landfills limited by landmines (WB, 1999). 
With ODA over $180 million committed the situation in the water supply sector has 
improved wit over 90% of urban and over 65 % of rural population with water 
connections (WB, 2001). However, one should interpret the rural figure with caution 
since rural households who are not connected to running water may still have an 
acceptable water source. 
Important shortfalls still exist-the unaccounted for water is in excess of 55% on average. 
A reasonable benchmark for unaccounted for water in Western Europe and also other 
(post)-transition countries like Poland and Chile is about 15-30%. In Albania 
unaccounted for water is 45%. Normal periodic maintenance is not done and the aging 
system is degrading rapidly. Owing to the high water loss, most cities are not able to 
provide regular supply with the existing storage and pumping systems. In a sample of 17 
municipal water utilities less than 50% had reliable 24-hour service (EC, 2004). 
 
4.4.4 Government and Civil Society  
 
With ODA $ 1 billion committed to this sub-sector one should expect the greatest 
achievements in economic governance in BiH. In the 2004 Report, the Commission 
stated that: 
“Despite some success in macro-economic stabilization, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not 
yet firmly on the path of self-sustaining growth. As pointed out in the Feasibility   34 
Study, productive capacity and thus exports remain weak; FDI, though improving, is 
insufficient to compensate for large current account imbalances. Private sector 
development needs to be encouraged through an improved business environment, better 
corporate governance, reduced labour rigidities, revived privatization and the creation of 
an environment which facilitates market exit and entry. Even if / when 
Bosnia and Herzegovina addresses the limited short-term priorities identified in the 
Feasibility Study, it will still have a challenging medium-term agenda to address. 
This underlines the need for coherent, but urgent action’’ (EC, 2004). 
The reason for this poor record, especially in economic governance lies in the fact that in 
BiH international community (PIC for 1996-2000 period) used traditional, old fashion 
model of reforms sequencing (Table 22).  
 
Table 22: Sequencing post-conflict reconstruction 
 
Source: (USAID, 2004) 
 
The traditional view of sequencing has been to put activities such as establishing security 
and providing humanitarian assistance first, followed by economic reforms in a later 
period, with institution building and capacity building in the last stages of development. 
ODA committed to this sub-sector in last three years equals amounts for all previous 
post-conflict years what proves our stance that economic governance was not top priority 
in initial reconstruction period.  
The problems with this traditional view are that, first, many economic reforms are 
necessary immediately to create conditions for growth and to deprive instigators of the 
conflict of their economic power base, and, second, activities such as institution building 
and capacity building take many years, so should be started earlier rather than later. The 
period at the very start of reconstruction, while difficult and often chaotic, is also an 
important window of opportunity to undertake politically difficult reforms and   35 
institutional changes—an opportunity that, if lost, might not reappear during the 
reconstruction process. 
In BiH case the important structural reforms were delayed partly due to lack of strategic 
vision in early post-conflict years. 
A more successful model of sequencing, therefore, would be to start a wider range of 
activities early in the reconstruction effort, finishing quickly short-term activities such as 
security and humanitarian assistance, and continuing longer-term activities such as 
economic reforms and institution building and capacity building for a number of years. 
In this way, the reconstruction effort is integrated into longer-term development (USAID, 
2004). 
International community learned by doing in BiH and realized that important structural 
reforms will be less politically feasible at a later stage. The only possible solution to 
expand necessary reforms was to promise EU membership if BIH fulfills required tasks. 
Since 2000 the country is gradually shifting from the “push” of OHR to the “pull” of the 
European Union (EBRD, 2005). 
 
Even prior to 2000, the EU had been closely involved in the work of the OHR, for 
example, at its June 1998 Council meeting declaring the establishment of an EU/BiH 
Task Force, with the aim of increasing cooperation and assisting in policy-making in the 
crucial areas of judicial reform, education, media, good governance and economic 
reform. However, despite an increasingly direct EU input into policy-making, the EU 
played a subordinate and supporting role within the PIC Dayton framework rather than 
dictating its own terms. The PIC Declaration from the December 1998 Madrid meeting, 
for example, stated that Dayton implementation was the priority and that it was the BiH 
'performance in implementing its Dayton obligations' that would dictate ’’the pace of 
integration into European structures’’(PIC, 1998).  
From 2000 onwards this relationship was to be reversed. The flexibility of the Dayton 
framework was to be fully revealed as the mechanisms of regulation shifted informally 
from the PIC to the EU.  
In March 2000 the European Union announced a Road Map as a first step for BiH in the 
SAP. This document established 18 key conditions which BiH had to fulfill in order to 
start the preparation of a Feasibility Study which would then form the basis of 
negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). These conditions 
covered far reaching policy reforms concerning elections, the civil service, state 
institutions, border services, the judiciary, trade regulations, foreign direct investment, 
property laws and public broadcasting. 
Recognition of the progress BiH has made in the implementation of the Feasibility Study 
reforms was in October 2005 when the European Commission has recommended to the 
Council opening of negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina on SAA. Further reforms, 
expected in near future, would not be possible in politically essentially divided country 
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4.4.5 Production sector 
 
Less then 3% of ODA was committed to production sector (Table 22). Even if it is a hard 
to imagine that reconstruction effort like the Marshall Plan could be possible in the state 
like BiH we want to emphasize some aspects of the most successive reconstruction effort 
in the history. 
The most significant aspects of the Marshall Plan were economic reconstruction and 
European integration. Under the Marshall Plan, for example, resources were allocated to 
restarting production in each country. Means for effective budget execution were created, 
including local country decision-making in procurements funded by donor money. 
Programs carried-out under the Marshall Plan emphasized production and integration of 
countries into a continent-wide economy (USAID, 2004). Completely opposite to 
shamefully low ODA committed to production sector in BiH.  
 
Table 23: PRODUCTION SECTORS 
Years 
Amount in millions of USD 
1996-2004  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
PRODUCTION SECTORS  205.410 13.298 24.904 41.25  23.644 13.367 17.364  30.689  23.63  17.264 
   Agriculture - Forestry - 
Fishing, Total  131.346 10.913 23.763 35.559 8.287  11.949 16.083  4.190  10.509 10.093 
      a) Agriculture  116.744 10.913 23.763 28.095 8.282  9.050  15.892  3.939 6.759  10.051 
      b) Forestry  13.092  -  -  7.464 0.005 1.878 0.017  0.25  3.750 0.019 
      c) Fishing  1.021 - - - -  1.021  0.175  - -  0.022 
   Industry - Mining - 
Construction, Total  55.871  0.298 1.023 5.691 3.151 1.046 1.265 26.488  13.093 4.114 
      a) Industry  55.144  0.277 1.023 5.662 2.578 1.046 1.224 26.485  13.037 4.089 
      b) Mining  0  - - -  0.573  - -  0.003  0.056  0.025 
      c) Construction  0  0.021 - 0.029 -  - 0.041 -  -  - 
   Trade & Tourism  17.349 2.087  0.117 - 12.205 0.373  0.015  0.011  0.028  3.057 
      a)Trade Policy and 
Regulations  14.292 2.087  0.117 - 12.205 0.373  0.015  0.011  0.028  0.444 





4.5 Military aid (Aid for security)  
 
Military aid is aid which is used to assist an ally in its defense efforts or to assist a poor 
country in maintaining control over its own territory and is not recorded as ODA. 
From 1996 to 2002, the U.S. under Train and Equip program has financed training at a 
fighting simulation center using U.S. software, courses at a professional development   37 
center and training in telecommunications, artillery and flight. The complete assistance 
was provided for FBiH military forces because of RS poor record on turning over war 
crimes suspects to the U.N. tribunal in The Hague. The Train and Equip program ($500 
million) helped to create stability in the region and made the Federation's military more 
NATO-compatible, said a U.S. government official, speaking on background 
(Kampschror, 2002).  
Another important form of ’’donation’’ to BiH, not recorded as ODA, was international 
military and police presence as a support to establishment and maintenance of security. 
Security is essential for reconstruction and for economic development. 
Economic growth requires security. Without security, either economic activity can not 
take place at all, or the added costs of security to private firms and individuals increase 
their costs, reduce their profitability, and reduce their competitiveness. Security is a 
public good that the government (with international support) mostly needs to provide. 
Without security at present and expectations of future security, investors are unwilling to 
invest. (USAID, 2004). 
On 14 December 1995 the GFAP was signed in Paris, after it had been negotiated in 
Dayton, Ohio. On 16 December the Alliance's North Atlantic Council launched the 
largest military operation ever undertaken by the Alliance, Operation Joint Endeavour.  
Based on UN Security Council Resolution 1031, NATO was given the mandate to 
implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. A NATO-led multinational 
force, called the Implementation Force (IFOR), started its mission on 20 December 1995. 
IFOR, with over 60.000 soldiers, was given a one-year mandate. 
Its primary mission was to implement ANEX 1A (Military Aspects) of the GFAP. It 
accomplished its principal military tasks by causing and maintaining the cessation of 
hostilities; separating the armed forces of the FBiH and the RS by mid-January 1996; 
transferring areas between the two Entities by mid March; and, finally, moving the 
Parties' forces and heavy weapons into approved sites, which was realized by the end of 
June. For the remainder of the year IFOR continued to patrol along the 1,400 km long de-
militarized Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) and regularly inspected over 800 sites 
containing heavy weapons and other equipment. Due to IFOR's early success, a secure 
environment was established.
20 
In November and December 1996, a two-year consolidation plan was established in Paris 
and elaborated in London under the auspices of the Peace Implementation Conference. 
On the basis of this plan and the Alliance's own study of security options, NATO Foreign 
and Defence Ministers concluded that a reduced military presence (32.000) was needed 
to provide the stability necessary for consolidating the peace. They agreed that NATO 
should organize a Stabilization Force (SFOR), which was subsequently activated on 20 
December 1996, the date the IFOR mandate expired.  
Under UN Security Council Resolution 1088, of 12 December 1996, SFOR was 
authorized to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement as the legal 
successor to IFOR. Like IFOR, SFOR operated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
                                                 
20  SFOR website   38 
(peace enforcement). SFOR had the same robust rules of engagement for the use of force, 
should it has been necessary to accomplish its mission and to protect itself. 
The primary mission of SFOR was to contribute to the safe and secure environment 
necessary for the consolidation of peace. Its specific tasks were: 
· To deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace.  
· To promote a climate in which the peace process can continue to move forward.  
· To provide selective support to civilian organizations within its capabilities. 
21 
In the light of the improved security situation in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
wider region, the Alliance brought SFOR to a conclusion in December 2004. As 
continuation of international presence the European Union deployed its own mission, 
EUFOR, to take on key security tasks in the country. EUFOR derived its mandate from a 
new UN Security Council resolution and had an initial strength of 7,000 that is equal in 
size to SFOR. The EUFOR mission is supported by NATO under the so-called ‘Berlin 
Plus’ arrangements that provide the framework for NATO-EU cooperation.  The role of 
IFOR (Operation Joint Endeavour) was to implement the peace. The role of SFOR 
(Operation Joint Guard / Operation Joint Forge) and the European Union’s follow-on 
mission EUFOR was/is to stabilize the peace. 
22 
Now, we will try to quantify this military assistance. Costs of assignment of military 
personnel are borne by the contributing countries. 
From 1996 to 2004 NATO committed around 235.000 soldiers to BiH (Table 24).  
 
Table 24: Number of NATO soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina 




60.000 32.000 33.000 33.000 21.000 21.000 16.000 12.000 7.000 7.000 
Source: SFOR website 
 
Estimates of cost per soldier vary from 2-2.5 times the per capita GDP per year 
(Donnelly, 2001) to the Stimson Centre’s estimate that cost on average per year for each 
American soldier in Bosnia was $219,737. Knowing that around 20.000 American 
soldiers were in BiH
23  in 1996 and that military costs for US Government in BiH in that 
year exceeded $2.5 billion (GAO, 2000) we can calculate cost per US soldier for that 
year. It is around $125.000 per each soldier. Some experts state that the average wealthy 
European country spends about $80,000 per soldier per year, the US spends $200,000, 
and the British spend $155,000 dollars.  
If we multiply $80,000
24 with 235.000 we obtain figure (18.8 billion) which drastically 
surpasses ODA.  
As we said economic growth requires security.  
                                                 
21 Ibid 
22 EUFOR website 
23 SFOR website 
24 Our average estimate of cost per year for one soldier   39 
However, security and economic growth are mutually reinforcing. Only with economic 
development will come new job expansion, creating opportunities for the population 
other than in violence and thuggery. So it is wrong to think that security must precede 
economic development—both must come together, iteratively, and lack of progress with 
one will hinder the other (USAID, 2004).  Security costs of around $18.8 billion almost 







Since the First Donor Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina (December 20-21. 1995) 
to the end of 2004 total commitments and disbursements of Official Development 
Assistance to BiH exceeded $7.25 billion and $ 6.8 billion respectively. The biggest 
donors were European Commission, United States and World Bank with credit lines 
under IDA terms. They committed $ 3.9 billion from 1996 to 2004, more then all other 
donors did together.  
Overall guidance of the reconstruction process rested, at the apex, on PIC and the OHR, 
which had final authority over all civilian aspects of the agreement.  
Coordination for each sector was provided by 11 sector task forces, with each task force 
chaired by a different lead donor and Economic Task Force, chaired by OHR, as a supreme 
coordinator. The governments of BiH, at what ever level, have not been actively involved 
in aid coordination. The mobilization of assistance for BiH reconstruction was successful, 
but donor cooperation much less so. A particular source of tension was that OHR and the 
EU had political mandates in BiH, whereas the World Bank only an economic mandate. 
Thus, the OHR sometimes wanted to condition aid on political steps, or design sector 
programs to achieve political objectives that were beyond to the Bank's mandate. 
Coordination and aid management in BiH are still not on a satisfactory level and 
government representatives should eagerly embrace newest incentive related to increase 
in aid effectiveness-Paris Declaration. 
 
The most important achievements took place in the peace implementation activities 
which were necessary for ensuring reconciliation and a fertile ground for reconstruction 
and recovery. International support for establishment and maintenance of security 
exceeded $ 18 billion in the period 1996-2004 in BiH. 
However, more than decade after the end of the war, BiH still suffers from the legacy of a 
conflict that ruined country’s physical productive capacity, wore out human resources 
and fractured institutions and social capital. 
While aid driven post-conflict reconstruction has been relatively successful, insufficient 
structural reforms made BiH lagging behind most of the transition countries in the region. 
In period from 1996 to 1999 which we named Reconstruction period, primarily because 
extraordinary high share of ODA was directed in Emergency assistance and 
reconstruction sector, the basic infrastructure-transportation, communication and power 
networks-have been rehabilitated and 645.000 persons (350.000 refugees and 295.000   40 
displaced) returned to their prewar homes which makes around 65% of the total number 
of returns to Bosnia and Herzegovina since the Dayton Peace Agreement. Unlike 
Marshall Plan where resources were allocated to restarting production in each country, 
donors committed less than 3% of ODA to production sector in BiH. Additionally, 
institutional framework for enterprise development and SME support in BiH remains 
weak and underdeveloped and urgent changes in business climate are needed in order to 
sustain economic expansion amid declining official aid.  
The reason for this poor record, especially in economic governance, lies in the fact that in 
BiH was used traditional, old fashion model of reforms sequencing, where economic 
reforms with institution and capacity building were left for later stages of development. 
The period at the very start of reconstruction, while difficult and often chaotic, is also an 
important window of opportunity to undertake politically difficult reforms and 
institutional changes—an opportunity that, if lost, might not reappear during the 
reconstruction process. 
In BiH the important structural reforms were delayed due to lack of strategic vision in 
early post-conflict years. From 2000 Road Map and the prospect of signing a SAA to EU 
are compelling BiH politicians to undertake necessary reforms which would not be 
possible, in politically essentially divided country, without promised the pot of gold that 



























As external financing constitute a significant portion of the available resources to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, accurate information on allocation and availability of these funds is 
critical for the Bosnian authorities to track their development program, help improve 
coordination among donors, and integrate external financing into the budget. 
There were/are three sets of databases to track donor assistance flows in BiH: 
•  Bottom-up government database 
•  Top-down WB/EC database 
•  Top-down the International Development Statistics  databases (IDS) including the 
Development Assistance Committee  (DAC) and the Creditor Reporting System 
online (CRS) 
 
Bottom-up government database 
 
The first aid database in BiH was compiled by the International Monitoring Group 
(IMG), an NGO. It had tracked donor funding for large parts of the reconstruction phase, 
covering both Entities. IMG stopped inputting new data when its project funding ended in 
2000, handing over the respective databases to the two Entities. In RS, these data (which 
had originally been put in MS Access by IMG) were ported to a FoxPro database, and 
MoERC continued updating it on this new platform. In FBiH, the database was 
essentially left dormant with more ad hoc registering of new information. 
The UNDP launch project in 2002
25 aiming to program a new database, also in MS 
Access, because the original IMG programming was not flexible enough to provide the 
kind of reporting that was seen as desirable. The old IMG data, the updated RS data in 
FoxPro, the data that had been compiled by FBiH, and the new Public Investment 
Program data have all been fed into this consolidated database (UNDP, 2004a).   
There are some serious holes in the database. The first issue is that the database uses the 
information provided by the local authorities. For a number of reasons, considerable 
funds have not been captured in this way, including the considerable funds channeled 
through many of the NGOs during the reconstruction period (the authorities had limited if 
any records of this funding). There are major problems classifying some of the projects, 
and some activities that took place both in RS and the FBiH may have been registered 
differently in the two, and there may both have been some double counting and at the 
same time some lack of recording because original information was unclear, etc.  
Additionally, this Aid Database is struggling with coding the projects correctly. Sector 
coding has turned out to be particularly difficult to sort out because each Entity has used 
a different coding approach. 
Many of the completed projects contained in the IMG database are virtually impossible to 
classify correctly due to lack of complete information and because one project could 
                                                 
25 UNDP Programme Support to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Management and Coordination of 
Development Resources 
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cover so many different regions or activities. This means that it is difficult to get the 
correct picture of the resource flows into the different sectors and regions. That is, not 
only do RS and FBiH use different codes for the same sector – which is easy to address – 
but they break down sectors differently. What are four sectors in RS is only one in FBiH, 
while similar opposite cases also exist. In order to break down the FBiH projects into the 
more detailed RS structure in this first case, each project has to be reviewed to see what 
the most appropriate code is (UNDP, 2004a). But the most important thing characterizing 
this database is that we can not conclude exact year of commitment or disbursement for 
more than half of the recorded projects. All above mentioned characteristics of this 
database made it inappropriate for our analysis. 
 
Top-down WB/EC database 
Although used as reference for initial reconstruction period, in recent World Bank 
publications data on ODA is taken from IDS database.
26   
 
Top-down the International Development Statistics databases  
 
The IDS database contains information on financial flows for Official Development 
Assistance. It provides a set of basic data that can be used to analyze where aid goes, 
what purposes it serves and what policies it supports.  Data can be find at the level of 
individual projects or in the form of summary statistics. Comparability is of the essence 
and the data are reported on the same basis by all donor countries. Data from 1973 
onwards are available on-line (www.oecd.org/dac/stats/dac). The comprehensiveness of 
the database is assessed each year to verify the extent to which the data can be exploited 
in analytical work and compared across countries. ’’These characteristics make it a 
unique tool for monitoring development co-operation by sector, donor and recipient.’’
27 















                                                 
26 See for example Bosnia and Herzegovina Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the 
Transition to a Market Economy,  An OED Evaluation of World Bank Support, 2004 
27 OECD/Development Assistance Committee website   43 
Appendix 2 
 
Amount ($ Million)  
1996  1997 1998 1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
ALL 
Donors,Total  1023.34 948.23 967.46 1276.32 702.38 612.33 512.37 531.18 681.56 
Multilateral 
,Total  391.57  363.89 308.84 370.11  181.2  266.84 235.65 154.87 315.83 
Australia -  - - -  - 0.01  - - - 
Austria  95.29  42.51 39.73 26.87 122.25  9.93 7.67 11.83  16.16 
Belgium  2.6  4.32 3.99 5.73  1.28 6.04 1.88 0.66 1.04 
Canada - 8.16  19.86  16.95  10.37 14.65 4.31  0.12  26.94 
Denmark -  - - -  - - - 0.07  0.02 
Finland 12.15  10.07  5.24  5.6  3.05 7.42 4.79 6.75 6.39 
France  4.92  4.53 8.42 114.33  18.39  2.03 1.89 14.31  3.14 
Germany  48.97  34.38 47.47 131.29 25.21 27.25 26.1  24.63 53.43 
Greece  7.22  10.39 22.17 1.98  6.3  8.82 5.73 5.31 7.08 
Ireland  5.91  2.29 0.18 0.24  2.18 1.54 1.55 1.05 0.74 
Italy 70.55  6.89  8.3  7.06  33.87  4.85 8.85 6.4  10.04 
Japan  25.06  106.9 52.21 20.62  13.62 19.2  15.69 25.16 24.33 
Luxembourg 0.91  1.07 1.35 2.05  0.89 0.58 0.34 0.65 0.35 
Netherlands 44.18 74.67  68.25  76.82  63.78 42.95 32.86 105.13  21.89 
New  Zealand  0.03  - - -  - - - - - 
Norway  -  26.02 45.76 32.69  14.81 12.68 17.9  18.8  15.24 
Portugal  -  -  0.99 0.92  1.05 0.89 2.18 1.12 7.37 
Spain -  6.1  31.5  30.27  34.78 25.16 27.8  30.67 24.73 
Sweden  -  -  39.39 13.31  25.6  27.82 32.35 29.41 45.53 
Switzerland 30.73  7.1 10.05  113.58 21.91 11.65 9.07  7.05  18.15 
United Kingdom  0.56  1.76  3.37  6.86  7.08 6.13 7.28 12.62  10.98 
United States  251.52  234.5  247.28 294.95  104.85 115.09 68.46  73.64  52.18 
EBRD  5.14  7.84 2.75 6.38  0.97 3.32 0.22 1.05 0.64 
EC  180.31  252.44 170.66 192.97  137.63 127.17 128.43 105.63 106.64 
IDA  175.6 82  127 163  37.6  124.35  102 48.19  208.55 
IFAD  6.32  14  - -  - 12  - - - 
Arab  Agencies  -  - - -  5 - 5 - - 
Czech  Republic    -  -  0.76 0.23  0.47 0.24 -  -  - 
Korea    -  0.72 0.01 0.56  0.43 0.35 0.02 0.05 20 
Poland    -  - 2.23  -  - - - - - 
Slovak  Republic  -  - - -  - - - 0.18  - 
Turkey  -  - - -  - 0.2  - 0.66  - 
Arab  Countries  31.17  1.96  - 3.3  9 - - - - 
Donor 
Other Bilateral 
Donors  -  -  0.11 -  0.01 0.01 -  0.04 - 
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